The Risk of an Iranian Assassination Attempt on President Trump.

 By Josiah Ranen

The would be assassin Cole Allen failed to kill president Trump because he was only one man and lacked the necessary firepower to forces his way thru the heavily secured entrance the ballroom at the Hilton hotel. He was  armed only with a shotgun shooting bird pellets. The large amount of security personnel quickly reacted and they were obviously well trained and prepared for a one lone wolf threat. Cole was never going to succeed against dozens of police and secret service agents. While the ballroom was well secured Cole Allen noted that “If I was an Iranian agent,” he wrote, “I could have brought a damn Ma Deuce [.50-caliber machine gun] in here [the Hilton hotel] and no one would have noticed shit.” 

Considering that this administration has publicly worried about Iranian sleeper cells, this brings up an interesting question, why was only the ballroom secured, and not the entire hotel? Because the decision to secure only the ballroom posed a serious risk of the complex attack being carried out by a foreign state team of multiple shooters armed with crew served weapons and explosives. If such a force carried out an attack in such a way as to assault thru all three entrances and place a holding force at the only exit the nit was entirely possible that these shooters could have trapped the president within the ballroom, pinning him down until more forces could be dispatched. 

The image below helps illustrate the larger concern raised by the attempted attack. The immediate protective zone around the ballroom appears to have been heavily secured, and that likely explains why a lone attacker could not get close enough to succeed. The security response was fast, organized, and effective against a single-person threat.

But let imagine foe a second that this was not the lone wacko Cole Allen but a trained team of Iranian Operatives consisting of no less than four shooters. Cole Allen's observations make it clear that entire squad of 8-12 men could have staged inside the hotel before assaulting the ballroom. If such a team of attackers had managed to pin down officers and Secret Service personnel near the exits, the likely result would have been mass causalities with the secret service resorting to a temporary protective lockdown rather than an immediate evacuation.

From a security-review perspective, the danger is that the Secret Service loses mobility. The president’s survival often depends on the ability to move quickly from a public area to a secure vehicle, hardened room, or alternate safe location. If exits are blocked or under pressure, the protective detail may have to keep the president in place, shield him, and wait for a counterassault or rescue element to reopen a route.

First, evacuation would become much harder.

A blocked exit turns the ballroom into a containment problem. Security may still protect the president inside the room, but they lose the ability to move him away from the threat quickly. If the assaulting Iranian team converged on all entrances, they could have used  fragmentation grenades and flashbangs to quickly disorient the defending forces. A quick and focused field of fire at the entrances could have meant a penetration thrust thru one of the three entrances. 

Here the protective detail moved the president towards the only exit. But if we place a team of shooters to prevent escape thru the only exit, the situation would have deteoriated rapidly.  At this point the protective detail would shift from evacuation to defense. Agents would likely form a close protective shield, and retreat back into the ballroom and try to create time until additional armed response arrived. Everything defends on holding the entrances. 

Secondly , confusion among the crowd would increase the risk. A ballroom full of people creates panic, movement, noise, blocked aisles, and medical emergencies. That makes it harder for police and Secret Service to distinguish threats from fleeing attendees.

The outside response would become decisive. Local tactical teams, federal response units, hotel security, and additional law enforcement would likely focus on isolating the building, clearing access routes, and restoring control of the exits. The event could become a hostage, barricade, or mass-casualty scenario. That is the worst-case concern. Even if the attackers never reached the president, pinning down exits could trap attendees and delay medical evacuation.

The casualty risk would be potentially catastrophic.  A crowded ballroom with limited exits, panic, obstructed movement, and delayed medical evacuation could produce serious casualties even without prolonged direct violence. The greatest danger would come from the combination of crowd compression, blocked exits, delayed evacuation, and delayed medical treatment.

The after-action lesson is simple: a security plan cannot depend on a single exit route or a single protected corridor. High-risk events need layered venue control, multiple secure evacuation options, protected fallback areas, and enough outside response capacity to reopen routes quickly if the first plan fails. The entire hotel should have been secured not just the ballroom.